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Military Railways In India
Part One - Railways on the North Western Frontier, 1880 to 1917
Little has been written about the use of railway equipment by the Indian Army in India during the zenith of the
British power. This article is an attempt to start correcting this, using contemporary documents that are now part
of the India Office Collection at the British Library in London.
From the time that the East India Company established Britain's interest in India as the main power broker in the
mid 17th century, the defence of its borders became of paramount importance. The huge land border of India was
a problem to defend. Before the European colonists arrived in South Asia, the land was a vast area ruled by a
vast array of local princes, maharajahs, and viziers. By the early 19th century, the East India Company's sphere
of control extended in the north west as far as the border with Afghanistan (through a treaty with the Prince of
the Punjab).
Afghanistan was viewed as a strategic buffer between the British and Russian empires. Although Britain and Russia
were nominally allies, there was a great deal of mistrust between the two. Russia's southern borders were expanding
south all of the time. Even though warfare was a world away from modern warfare, it was reckoned that an army
would be able to move over the Russia's southern frontier across into Afghanistan and through the passes of the
Khyber and Bolan into India's northern borders. For the whole of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia vied
for supremacy in the area, playing out what came to be known as the "Great Game".
Britain fought its First Afghan war in 1838-42. It was a disastrous campaign. An army 15,000 British and Indian
troops, and a caravan of nearly 30,000 bearers, cooks, wives, children, farriers, servants et al had marched into
Kabul to put the British choice of ruler on the throne, Shah Shujah. The British/Indian army remained to ensure
the lasting of the Shah's rule, as he was not the universal choice as a ruler. The inevitable uprising took place
in 1841 and the remaining garrison of 16,000 people was forced to leave Kabul. In arguable the most inept piece
of military leadership in British colonial history, nearly the entire ensemble was massacred between Kabul and
the Bolan pass, only around a handful reaching the town of Jalalabad, in what is today Pakistan, just after the
new year in 1842.
By the time the British had reason to send forces into Afghanistan, things had moved on in warfare in the intervening
years. In the 1880's, the logistics of war had changed. Railways were now seen as means as moving troops and
weapons over large distances far quicker than horses could. In theory, soldiers could be hundreds of miles from
the front and fighting there within a week. The Russians had built a standard gauge railway line to within 70
miles of Heart, 400 miles to the west of Kabul. With it, they could move troops from Moscow south, across the Caspian
Sea and onward again by rail to within 50 miles of Afghanistan's western border.
This worried the British. With the Russians so close to Kabul, the British needed a quick way to move the amount
of troops that would be needed to fight a war with perceived to fight the coming war with the Russians. The second
Afghan war was fought between 1878 to 1880. Concerning this, the British army decided to first use a strategic
railway. They decided to build a metre gauge line through the Bolan Pass to aid the movement through this precipitous
pass into Afghanistan. Today this area is the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan. The first use made the
British military of railways in India was in 1879 when the military authorities ordered 25 Double Fairlie type
locos from the Avonside Engine Co Ltd of Bristol. They were to be used on a metre gauge line planned to go up through
the Bolan Pass.
By the time the first loco was delivered, the war was over and the machines were no longer needed. So the authorities
tried to cancel the order. Unfortunately for them 17 of the 25 locos had already been built. These locos had to
now go somewhere so they ended up on as property of the Indian State Railways.
Only 15 of the locos actually ended up working as Indian State Railway (ISR) locos. One was unfortunately lost
at sea and one was immediately sold to "contractor in Bombay". ISR numbered them 361 to 377. An unknown
number of them were supplied without side tanks, which reduced their axle weight to 8 tons. Two of the locos were
erected for trials on the Rajpatuna Malwa Railway and the Holkar State Railway. The trials proved unsuccessful
and the locos were returned to store along with the other 13 locos.
Between 1885 and 1886, all the locos were belated sent to the Bolan Pass but had again been put into storage by
1887. In 1896, ten locos were sent for use on Burma Railways. They were Avonside works numbers 1247 - 54, 1257
- 62, 1265 - 1266 and 1273 - 76. Burma Railways numbered them 141 to 150 and classified them as D class. They
were used acquired for use on the branch from Mandalay eastwards to Lashio, which include 11 miles of 1 in 25 gradient.
The Farlie's were not well suited for the task and were in poor condition and were subsequently withdrawn from
1904. Not all were cut up and some carried in service being used for ferry shunting duties for some years after
this date.
Of the remaining five locos, four also found later found further use. They were transferred to the South Indian
Railway in 1907 for use on the Niligiri Railway. This line with its 1 in 12½ gradient ran from Mettapuliyam
to Ootacumund, or more colloquially Ooty. The locos were classified I class and numbered 1 to 4. The line opened
in its extension from Coonor to Ooty in 1908 and these were the only adhesion locos to have worked on this line.
It is assumed they were obtained in connection with this extension as it was unlike the original 1897 section,
which was worked by the Abt rack system. It is unknown when they were withdrawn.
After the Second Afghan campaign, the British military authorities did some serious thinking about their use of
railways. The next locos to find a military use were two locos delivered in between 1883 and 1884. There were both
500mm gauge and experimental. W G Bagnall Ltd of Stafford built one and the other was collaboration between Decauville
and Couillet. It appears that both of them were designed to taken apart and transported overland.
The idea of a portable railway is something that much time and effort was given over to. The following is a memorandum
by Sir Henry Green entitled Portable Railways in Military Operation. It was published in "Our Scientific Frontier"
in 1880 and describes the reasoning behind using a railway instead of animal transport for military operations.
As an instance of the benefits which may be secured by the employment of portable railways in military operations
we may refer briefly to the experience of the difficulties of ordinary modes of transport gained during the recent
campaign in Afghanistan and the present state of affiars in that country. The new treaty of Gundamuk lately concluded
by the British & Afghan Governments give to the former certain strategic positions situated beyond the actual
frontier of India, but to obtain the greatest advantages both military and commerce from these positions it is
necessary that they should be connected with the Indian railway system.
The most important of these is the town of Quetta, situated in the Valley of Shawl, which latter commences after
passing the summit of the Bolan Pass. This position will in future become of the greatest importance both as a
strategic and commercial depot, and in the case of the future political complications which might be caused by
a Russian advance on Herat, would become the base from which an army would start. It becomes, therefore, absolutely
necessary to connect Quetta by rail at the earliest date with the Indian system. This system is now extended to
Sukkar on the Indus, a distance of about 225 miles from Quetta. The first portion of the road leads to Jacobabad
- 50 miles - over nearly a dead level for the whole distance, then to Dadur about 90 miles. The only difficulties
to be met with are the floods from the Indus, which at certain times of the season runs across the road from Dadur
to the summit of the Bolan is through the pass of that name, and a good road has already been constructed. We then
come to the Valley of Shawl at the north end of which is the town of Quetta. It is situated at a distance of 25
miles the road leading over the hard level plain.
On the first part of the road made from Sukkar to Dadu a permanent railway will have to be constructed. This will
be for some time deferred owing to the difficulty, before shown, of controlling the floods from the river - probably
another 5 years will see it unfinished; the next portion of the Pass must take a considerable time before the rail
can be constructed, but from its summit the country is particularly adapted for a line such as that shown today
(Fowlers Portable Railway worked in the gardens of Stafford House 7/1879) and such a line if laid down would give
great assistance in conveying military stores to our new outposts at which a really large magazine must be prepared.
The loss of camels during the recent campaign is estimated at from 30 to 40,000; the effect has been to almost
exhaust the supply of the frontier provinces and which supply it will take years to replace. It therefore becomes
necessary that every mechanical means should be employed to lessen the demand for such transport - more particularly
that if any sudden demand were to be caused by political complications, camel transport would not be procurable
except under very great difficulties and enormous expenditure. The loss sustained to the Treasury by the mortality
amongst these animals during the late campaign cannot have been much less than £200000, and if these means
of transport is the only one employed to our new outpost, a continuous must ensure.
From the above we may deduce the following that had the railway been in existence between Sukkar and Dadu and between
the summit of the Bolan and Quetta before the late campaign it might have been completed, including rolling stock,
for a less sum than it has cost the State for the loss of camels and the railway would have still been in their
possession for further work.
For instance, a portable railway as that now exhibited, and described above, could be laid down between the summit
of the Bolan and Quetta, a distance of 25 miles, for the sum of £25000, including rolling stock, this being
equal cost of say, 500 camels at £7.00 each. It is to be borne in mind that such a railway is not merely
suitable for being worked by steam power, but it is as we have already stated equally efficient as a tramway, and
on it a camel could haul a load of about 5 tonnes whereas the load a camel can carry is but about 350lbs. Under
efficient supervision a camel will march 20 miles a day.
The British military were obviously trying out a new form of rapid advance through hostile and fairly impassable
terrain by using all that the new industrial world could aid them with. If they wanted to go through, say into
Afghanistan again a railway would offer them swiftness of movement from the rear echelons to the font line. It
is known what the outcome of the experiment was - one can conclude unsuccessful as it doesn't seem to have been
taken up widely in the future.
At around the same time a committee was set up to look at the strategic values and uses for light railways in frontier
areas. The authors looked at various narrow gauge railways around India and compared their strengths and weaknesses.
One of the conclusions drawn was that the gauge to be used for military railways was to be 2'6" gauge. This
was mainly due to the fact that there were more 2'6" gauge railways already in India that material and equipment
could be borrowed from than there were 2'0" gauge lines. One of the effects of this was the first two locos
that had been ordered for the Kalka Simla Railway had to be re-gauged to 2'6" as it had been planned to be
a 2'0" line.
In 1885, a memo was sent outlining the strength of a proposed 8th (Railway) Company of the Royal Engineers. As
a fighting military unit it left much to be desired - its only soldiers were two captains, two lieutenants and
a company sergeant major. However its main duties were to be the running of small railways as its remainder was
composed of six engine drivers, six firemen, nine guards, nine station masters, six assistant station masters and
telegraphists, nine pointsmen and signal men, one running shed foreman, three fitters, one boiler maker, nine smiths,
fourteen hammer men, two cleaners, two carriage greasers, nine carpenters, two foremen platelayers, nine leading
hands and eighteen platelayers. Completing the company were one pay corporal, two tailors, one bootmaker, one company
cook and two buglers. Sadly, the documents that I have found say nothing about where this company were to be deployed
or on what duties.
On 29th March 1900, a formal indent was placed by the Financial Department of the Army for the purchasing of 50
miles of light railway materials. This included "Engines, tank, capable of hauling 40 tons up gradients of
1 in 50, excluding their own weight. 10 locomotives" at a total cost of £16, 000. They were also to
have 300 gallon side tanks. These locos were ordered from W G Bagnall Ltd of Stafford, works numbers 1629 to 1630,
built in 1900 and 1901.
Rolling stock was to consist of 150 four wheeled trucks, at a cost of £60000. Permanent way was to consist
of enough 21lb track, steel sleepers, fish plates and spikes for 50 miles of track, including 40 sets of points
and crossings. The total cost of the track was £30202.
Along with the railway equipment, the indent was also use to purchase traction engines with winding drums to the
value of £8000 (it does not say how many). They were to be "Uganda pattern, supplied by John Fowler
& Co with head cranes, 124" jib and side winding drum. Water and fuel tenders and wagons to take 6 tons
each". To be used on the drums, just over 9 cwt of 6" galvanised steel cable, just over 1 cwt of 2"
steel rope and 10 travellers were purchased at £2440 for the lot.
Although purchased to be the stock to form a reserve stock, when the equipment was delivered it was sent straight
to the Khushwas Kohat Thal Railway (KKTR) from a junction Khushwas on the broad gauge line of the North Western
Railway to Kohat; the line opened in 1902. For the first year of operation an ariel ropeway bridged the gap across
the River Indus at Khushwas but this was closed after an accident. In 1903, the line was extended from Kohat to
Thal, approximately 20 miles from the India/Afghan border. In 1908 the section from Khushwas to Kohat was converted
to broad gauge, including a bridge across the Indus.
In 1901, a year before the KKTR opened, the military had opened their first narrow gauge railway. It ran from a
junction at Nowshera on the broad gauge line of the North Western Railway to Degari, some 40 miles or so north.
Like Thal, Degari lay close to the India/Afghan border. It was known as the Nowshera Degari Railway (NDR).
Four interesting locos were used in the construction of the NDR and KKTR. The first two were two of the original
locos built for the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway (DHR). They were built in 1880 and obtained by the North Western
Railway in 1885 as part of a batch of four ex DHR locos they acquired for use on the Ferzopore Steam Tramway. This
was a 6¾ mile long line that ran across a temporary boat bridge on the River Sutlej. It opened in 1885 and
closed in 1888 when the permanent bridge was opened. The locos then disappeared for five years as nothing is known
about their whereabouts. In 1893, two of the four were sent to work at the NWR colliery at Dandot. The other two
were re-gauged to 2'6" and obtained by the NWR Gradient Division. They were used by the Gradient Division
as construction locos in conjunction with both the building of the NDR and KKTR.
The other two locos used in the construction were very interesting and lead very chequered careers. They were both
built as metre gauge locos for the Indian State Railway and used on the Punjab Northern State Railway, numbered
419 and 420. In 1894, they were re-gauged to 2'6" and transferred to work at Bhaganwalla Colliery, another
colliery operated by the NWR. After five years working here, they were transferred again this time to the Cooch
Behar State Railway and numbered 4 and 5. After a short sojourn here they returned to the NWR in 1901 to be used
as construction locos on the NDR and KKTR projects.
Number 4 was renumbered at an unknown date to 99. In 1914 it was sold to a company in Calcutta called Seth Apcar
and Co. It was sold on again in 1936 to the Kaligaht Falita Railway in Calcutta were it became their number 12.
Number 5 was later used on the construction of the Quetta to Nushki broad gauge line in 1908. It was later used
on the New Delhi construction project in 1913.
The traffic locos used on the NDR were mainly of a single type. There were nine 0-6-2 tender locomotives. The first
six were built in 1900, three by Kitson & Co Ltd, Leeds and three by Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd, Leeds. They
were numbered 1 to 6. They were joined in 1902 by another 3 built by Kitson and numbered 7 to 9. Along with these
a second hand 0-8-4T loco was acquired from the Barsi Light Railway (of the same design used on the Leek and Manifold
Railway in Staffordshire). Built by Kitson, it was ex BLR number 4 becoming number 21 on the NDR.
Back in the Military Department however, reports were being written. On 6th July 1901, a report was presented to
the Committee on Material and Organisation of Light Railways. One of the things discussed in it how a Military
Railway Reserve was to be maintained. It stated that 27 locomotives were to be maintained. Up to this date 23 locomotives
of a similar design had been ordered from Bagnalls. The initial 10 delivered straight to the KKTR, along with a
second batch in 1902. These differed slightly from the initial order in that they were to be supplied with 400
gallon water tanks and a four wheeled 400 gallon tenders. Ten of these locos were to be delivered to the reserve
with the balance of three going to the KKTR Numbered 71 to 73 on the KKTR. It is assumed that the balance of four
locomotives is made up of the two ex DHR and the two ex metre gauge locos.
Along with the locos, the reserve was now had 230 3 ton wagons and had acquired 30 brake vans. Its mileage of track
has risen to 140 miles (but there is no mention made of how many points and crossings were now possessed). In addition
to the totals of material, the report also discussed where the material was to be stored.
Its authors stated "We consider for instructional purposes, 15 miles of railway track with accessories, one
engine, eight wagons and one brake van should be handed over to the Bengal Miners and Sappers at Rurki". They
also recommended that "….the same amount of material and rolling stock should be given to the other corps
of Miners and Sappers". For the defensive position around Quetta, 15 of the 140 miles of track would be required
although no mention is made of any locos or rolling stock being required although it is assumed that they would
be used.
The remainder of the locos, rolling stock and track were to be put into store. The locos and rolling stock were
to be put into store in Rawlpindi along with 20 miles of track to accommodate it on. The remaining 80 miles of
the track were to be stored at Chaman. These arrangements for storage were "….in accordance with the advice
of the manager of the NWR….".It was suggested in the report that "The Officer in charge of the Railway
Company of Sappers and Miners might be instructed to make frequent inspections of this stock". At Rawlpindi,
sheds had been built to accommodate the locos at a cost of Rs18500. It was noted that the trucks and other plant
could be stored in the open.
On 13th March 1902, a dispatch was sent discussing "...a rough scheme for a company of Bengal Miners and Sappers".
It was stated that this company were "….to be regularly employed during peace time on the construction and
maintenance of the Kohat to Thal Railway and other suitable railway lines". The company strength was to be
a Company Commander, who would be a Major or Captain in the Royal Engineers, a Company Officer, who would be a
subaltern in the Royal Engineers and two Royal Engineers NCOs - these would all be British. The "native"
troop would consist of three Officers - one Subadar and two Janadars - six Havildars, ten Naicks, thirteen Artisans,
130 Sappers and two Buglers.
As regards the running of the unit they would "….be under military discipline, in all other respects it will
be under the Public Works Department as is the case of Officers and soldiers under civil employ".
In 1902 the Military Reserve obtained its final batch of locos from Bagnalls. They were 13 locos of the second
design with 400 gallon tanks and the four wheeled tender. Three were delivered to the KKTR (becoming KKTR numbers
74 to 76) and the balance became part of the Military Reserve.
The next piece of administrative paperwork dates from 26th December 1907 and is a dispatch from the Military Supply
(Financial) Department. It is a despatch seeking authorisation for expenditure for the 2nd Military Railway at
Quetta. In it we learn that the 2nd Railway Company was sanctioned "….as part of the proposals of His Excellency
the Commander in Chief for preparation of the Army in India for War". When the company was raised in 1905
the works expenditure had been estimated at RS 12000. It also adds that the company had been employed building
the Quetta to Nushki broad gauge line (where one of the converted metre gauge locos had gone, further reinforcing
the idea that these locos were considered to part of the Military Reserve).
The initial intention had been to accommodate the company in "….existing buildings owned by the railway company
at various points along the (Quetta - Nushki) line". However "….experience has shown it has been necessary
to keep a Headquarters detachment under continuos training at Quetta". It had therefore been decided to ask
for Rs 33, 362 to be spent on building the 2nd Railway Company a barracks in Quetta. It was to consist of quarters
for the British Commandant, quarters for Native Officers and a Havildar, barracks for 32 "…rank and file single
men". In addition to this a small workshop and store for clothing and military equipment were to be provided,
including an arms rack. It is interesting to compare the building costs for accommodation of a single British Officer
were Rs 11794 yet for two native officers the costs of accommodation were only Rs 1122!
The next document that I have been able to find concerning the two lines is another document written by the Financial
Depart of the Army. However this one is not an indent or bill or account but is more of a strategic philosophy
for why the two lines are a waste of money. Sent on 21st November 1908 and written by one O M Creagh, it starts
by explaining that the "Lol Shilman and Kohat Kuram lines were sanctioned to strengthen the strategic position
against Russia". They were considered as such as "….the centre of gravity in the Afghan theatre of war
in its defence against Russia by us in the Kandahar region".
Creagh suggests that any force operating in the Kuran - Khyber direction would be comparatively small and "….for
which railways would not be necessary if assisting a friendly Afghanistan". He goes on to say that if an attack
came from a Russo-Afghan attack it would be impossible, with current troop strengths to act in an offensive manner
and that the lines were therefore useless to the defence of the areas and could therefore be thought of as "unnecessary".
All of this good military sense had now however been negated since the 1905 Japan-Russian War. Since the defeat
of Russia in this war and the subsequent "….conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement…", the threat posed
by a Russian invasion of British India through Afghanistan had receded. In the light of this, Creagh insisted that
"….no more money be spent on these railways". He went on to add that "….against Afghanistan or the
tribes they are a luxury not a necessity".
As far as the Lol Shilman line was concerned, Creagh pointed out that "…considering our relation with Afghanistan
it cannot now be continued and it is extremely doubtful if it will ever be advisable to do so in the future".
Creagh also considered that it was "….useless from a military point of view to extend the existing lines for
Parachinar or to alter the NG from Kohat to Thull (SD note - considering that the first section of this line from
Kohat to Khushnar was converted to BG in the year that this letter was written). However, he conceded that from
an operational point of view, the break of gauge would interfere very little with working the line.
He concludes this part of his letter by recommending that "….no further expense be incurred on the Kohat Thull
line…..", whilst also agreeing with Sir Richard Ritchie's recommendation regarding the Lol Shilman line (whatever
this may have been - one can only guess that no expenditure for it either). Next he gives a good political reason
why the lines are more money and effort that they are worth - they stir up local dissent. He states that "….active
work on these lines gives the mullahs a line on which to preach and has a disturbing effect on the tribes".
His next criticism is aimed at the railway Board of the North Western Railway. He berates them for not dealing
with strategic lines as separate business and financial units. He complains that they have a bad habit of "….including
strategic proposals among those to ordinary railway business". This he argues means that the Military have
no visibility of the financial outgoings of the strategic railways.
He carries on to lament that "The great experience of the Government of India have in railway construction
in all conditions should enable them to frame estimates very approximately" - in other words they have been
doing this for years now, they should know that initial estimates are very rarely near the true costs. He obviously
felt that the financial affairs of Military strategic railways had gotten out of control. So bad indeed that Creagh
goes as far as suggesting that "….an example should be made…." of the officer involved in estimating
the costs for the KKTR. Apparently his name had been requested the previous year and this had had no effect!
No more money may have been spent but the next year more arrangements were made for the staffing of the Military
lines. On 18th November 1909, a confidential note was sent from the Indian Army HQ at Fort William in Calcutta
concerning the formation of a new Railway Corps. They were to be known as Railway Corps of Miners and Sappers.
The Company was to be of reservists who would cover the duties of the 1st and 2nd Railway Companies who were currently
"….on mobilisation….". The reservists were required to "….perform the duties of Engine drivers,
station masters, traffic inspectors and guards". The men, totalling fifty, would be "European or Eurasian
(also known as Anglo India)".
The fifty men were needed in the following numbers
Engine drivers 35
Station masters 3
Traffic inspector 1
Guards 11
For their trouble they would receive an extra 12 annas per diem. The total wage bill to the Army would be Rs 27400
- this would provide enough men to cover both 1st and 2nd Railway Companies.
The only definite use of the equipment in the Military Reserve between 1902 and 1916 is that it spent most of its
time in store. It was used twice but hardly for a short notice tactical reason. On both occasions it was used in
conjunction with the Delhi Durbars. These events, in 1902 and 1911, were official celebrations of the coronation
of new Emperor's of India - Edward VI and Edward VII. In 1902 12 locos were used and in 1911, 23 were used. There
is an article describing the 1902 Durbar railway in a collection of short articles about narrow gauge railways
published in Calcutta in 1911. It gives many interesting details about the railway.
The line was laid from the Kashmir Gate to the polo ground. It was laid as a double line and had a loop at each
end giving a continuos loop. This was divided into 13 sections. Trains followed each other around this loop - the
maximum number of trains running at one time was ten. Trains ran every 8 minutes. The double track was built on
8' centres, being 5' from fixed structures (which was not allowed on civilian 2'6" gauge lines). There was
a maximum width on the roadbed of 16' on a bank, 20' in cuttings. The maximum gradient was 1 in 80; the sharpest
curve was 120' radius.
The first works on the line - preliminary earthworks, culverts and spreading of permanent way materials - were
carried out by an unknown contractor. Work was taken over by two companies of the Bengal Miners and Sappers, who
commenced tracklaying upon their arrival. A cutting was blasted through the Delhi ridge, a 21' high rock escarpment.
16000 ft3 of rock was excavated from this cutting. This was achieved by the Sappers using dynamite in 24 days.
There was a bridge over the Najagarh Canal. This consisted on three spans each 10' centre to centre of the piers.
There were also a six foot arched culvert in the Ridge cutting and a 3' arch near the Mori Gate station. All other
openings were all 1'6" or 2' wide flat topped culverts formed by using unserviceable sleepers as the covering.
Work commenced on 1st August 1902. The line was inspected and passed for traffic use at 12 mph on 29th November
the same year. It was opened to public traffic on 1st December 1902. The line ran from the Kashmir Gate to various
Durbar camps on its route. Its main use was to reduce road traffic for the visitors and soldiers taking part. It
consisted of 4 miles of double track mainline and two single track branches - one of around a mile and a quarter
to the Amphitheatre and the other of just under a mile and a half to the Review branch. They closed on 18th January
1903. The cost of it all was Rs 125856-1-9 for construction and operation. In its six week of operation the railway
earned Rs 66222-10-0.
It was operated by 12 locomotives all belonging to the Military Reserve. Six had been working on the KKTR. The
other six were all delivered direct from England. 120 carriages were used, all of the "Military Service"
type - at least some of these were supplied to the Military Department from Orenstein & Koppel from their office
in Calcutta.
The next significant event for military railways on the North Western Frontier was the opening of the Kalabagh
Bannu Railway, which was also known as the Trans Indus Railway. This opened in 1913 and ran from Kalabagh, where
a wagon ferry crossed the Indus, to Bannu, a distance of 89 miles. A branch was opened in 1916 from Lake Marwat
to Tank. This included a ghat section with gradients of 1 in 45. A further line from Tank to Kaur and Khorgi was
commenced during the Warizistan unrest of 1919. This was opened in 1921.
The traffic locos on this line consisted of two different types of locomotive. Six were 4-6-2 locos supplied the
North British Locomotive Co Ltd, Glasgow, four delivered in 1911 and two in 1918. These were numbered 1 to 5. The
other type of locos were 2-8-2 locos. Between 1911 and 1919, North British delivered nine of these locos. They
were numbered as follows: 11 and 12 built 1911, 13 to 17 built 1915 and 20 and 21 built 1919.
These locos were identical to a similar type that North British had been supplying to the Bengal and Nagpur Railway
for use on their Satpura Lines network. A number of these were obtained second from the BNR in 1917 and 1918 -
further details of individual locos can be found the Military file in the Locations section of this website.
On the KKTR and NDR, it is assumed that things remained the same as from new. On the NDR the nine 0-6-2 North British
and one 0-8-4T Kitson operated on the line. On the KKTR, of the 16 Bagnall built locos were now down to 12. One
of the original batch of ten locos (with 300 gallon tanks) had been sold to an unknown company in Bombay in 1913
and another to the Tata Power Company on an unknown date. Of the second and third batches (with 400 gallon tanks
and four wheeled tender) one from each batch had been sent to a railway line construction project near Baroda,
the Ambaji - Taranga Light Railway, in 1915.
In 1916, this period of relative calm for these railways changed. Britain had been fighting in the country side
of France and Belgium for two years as well as parts of the Balkans and in Turkey. By 1916, as is well documented
elsewhere, the British started to use light railways in the field on a large scale (and somewhat contradicting
Mr Creagh of the Indian Army Financial Department, who it will be remembered considered railways unnecessary for
defensive positions.). One of the places that Britain needed light railways to assisting in the fighting of the
war was Mesopotamia, where they were fighting against the Ottoman Empire.
The equipment for this was acquired from India. This is in line with the report on railways as a strategic values
and uses for light railways in frontier areas delivered in 1885. In this, it was envisaged that mainline Indian
railways would be able to supply much of the equipment required for military campaigns, both in India and abroad.
There were good reasons for this rationale - the stock was built and readily available, the shipping costs were
less, the distances to move the equipment shorter. A number of metre gauge lines supplied locos and rolling stock
for military uses in Mesopotamia. Additionally a number of 2'6" gauge items were supplied.
From the seventeen locomotives that were in store as the Military Reserve, fourteen were mobilised and sent to
Mesopotamia in 1916. In addition to these eight locos that were working on the KKTR were sent to Mesopotamia. As
far as can be ascertained, they were not replaced by locos from elsewhere. Two years later in 1918 a further loco
from the KKTR was procured for overseas use - this time on the Bushire Light Railway in Persia. Along with the
entire (locos, rolling stock, track, and all fixtures and fittings) Powayn Steam Tramway, in Bengal was also sent
for used on the Bushire Light Railway. This left two 2-4-2ST on the KKTR by the end of 1918.
One valuable archive that I have been able to find is the papers of a soldier who served on the North Western Frontier
during WWI. They are letters, magazines and other documents that were either written or collected by a Lance Corporal
Howgego who served in India with the 1/25st Battalion, The London Regiment between 1916 and 1919. From the documents
this Battalion was a Bicycle Battalion - any further information anyone may have about this Battalion would be
gratefully received.
In the collection (which was donated to the British Library by Howgego on his death in the late 1970s) is a letter
that was written from Howgego to his mother whilst he was on rest and recuperation in Muree Hills, dated 11th September
1917. It is a very long letter where he was "At last I am able to give you a fairly full account of what I
have been through during the last 3 months…………….I wrote from Tank twice………….Well we had a fortnight in Tank Railway
Fort sleeping in native huts and I can you it was not a pleasant time".
He goes on to give a detailed account of actions that they had encountered whilst on manoeuvres around Tank. It
is worth quoting the next part of his letter verbatim...
"We camped that night
outside Zam Fort in a perimeter and moved off on the last 6 miles to Tank. As soon as we arrived at the station
we unloaded the luggage etc on the platform and the pack animals were sent to the depot, and I can tell you we
were glad to see the back of them. All baggage was packed onto the first train which was to leave at 7 o'clock
that evening.
We then went into a rest camp out side the station for the rest of the day. A and D companies were to leave by
the first train and they got aboard at 6 o'clock. Just before it was time to leave they had a message to say the
line had been breached midway between Tank and Kalabagh, so of course we could not travel. Well we kipped in for
the night in the tents and A and D companies were kept on the train.
About 3 o'clock in the morning I woke up and felt that I was lying water, so of course I shouted out to the rest
of the fellows and started to pack up, but the next moment a great wave of water about 18" high swept right
over everything and the only things I saved dry were my toppee and a pair of putties. Everything else was of course
soaked through. We had the order to grab our rifles and equipment and to make our way to the empty train. It was
some job too, raining like the ----, black as ink, about a 2 feet of water to wade through, barefooted and tons
of mud. We eventually got into the train and at day break we started salvaging.
We got what kit we could of our own and laid it out to dry on the platform and then got all the unclaimed stuff
and made a dump of it. You can imagine what it looked like and smelt like. A hot sun and a battalion kit wet through
with mud. We lay at Tank station 4 days while they were repairing the line.
We left Tank alright at night and arrived at Kalahbagh the next morning. We loaded the baggage on the ferry and
went across the Maru Indus. We had the day at the rest camp at Indus and left there at about 6 o'clock the same
evening, and arrived at Jullunder about 3 o'clock the next afternoon. They had a good spread ready for us in the
mess and it was good too, after bully beef and biscuits for 3 months."
From other documents that Howgego donated it is possible to date the above event. There is a copy of volume two
of the Londoner which was the Regimental magazine of the London Regiment. In it is a set of photographs of the
event which are stated to have been taken at Tank on 14th August 1917. There are five photographs, one of which
shows good views of coaches in the station platform.
There are a couple of references in the papers, which give small glimpses of the railways on the North Western
Frontier. There is an official document entitled Punjab Disturbances (2nd Edition). This was published in April
1919 by the Lahore Civil & Military Gazette Press. On page 42 is a note about the effects of rioters had had
on the railway at Warizabad. On 14th August 1919 rioters burned sleepers, fencing and telegraph communications.
One or two signals pulled up. A party from the Railway Miners and Sappers at Silakot was sent to repair the damage
to the railway.
However, the most interesting things donated by Howgego are his photographs. There are two albums and a number
of loose photos, which were taken whilst on leave and on duty in India. There are some good photos taken on the
Kalka Simla Railway and some others taken on railways in the south of India. However Howgego also took photographs
whilst on manoeuvres around Tank. One of these shows a train on the KBR depicting one of their North British 2-8-2
locos, number 13 taken at Pezu in Waziristan in 1917. Two other photos that were taken whilst on manoeuvres on
the KKTR, sadly undated. They show two of the 2-4-2T Bagnalls on KKTR. One of them is captioned on the rear stating
"KTR making tea at a way side station going up the line. B Company to Afghanistan. Hot water from engine."
The use of equipment from Indian railways by the Indian Army in their overseas campaigns will be discussed in the
next part of this article. |
